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The new wave of globalization backlash upon which populist movements have capitalized 
worldwide blames skewed rules in favour of the most privileged individuals and largest 
firms. The ‘us versus them’ uprising not only targets the establishment, free trade and the 
impunity of global finance in the wake of the global financial crisis, it also sees global 
corporations as increasingly able to set rules and solve disputes on their own terms. Be it 
the Canada‒European Union Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA), 
the aborted Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) or the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership (TPP) among Asia-Pacific countries, the authority gained by technical 
standards presumably set in favour of the most powerful global corporations has swiftly 
become among the most contentious issues in negotiations besides investor‒state dispute 
settlements mechanisms. European fears over the abolition of food safety standards 
standing in the way of importing ‘Frankenfood’ such as chlorinated chicken or hormone 
beef from the United States may be exaggerated. Yet, conflict-ridden negotiations for such 
mega trade deals do include provisions for greater mutual recognition of standards, and 
plans to set new regulatory councils in charge of designing future regulatory convergence 
around the type and scope of technical standards to be recognized in government regula-
tions (Cai 2016; De Ville and Siles-Brugge 2016; OECD 2016; Pitschas 2016; Magnette 
2017). Responding to the ‘us versus them’ discourse feeding populism and the latest wave 
of the globalization backlash thus supposes being able to understand who is in charge of 
shaping market power and determining market access. With regard to standards defin-
ing a common set of characteristics which particular goods or services are expected to 
conform to, the question is: to what extent are global corporations able to set standards in 
their own interests and ensure that such standards exercise a form of alternative authority 
to conventional state regulation and intergovernmental agreements?
Conventional accounts emphasize global welfare benefits to standardization. Rather 
than lengthy processes set by public authorities for defining mandatory regulations, 
standards set within standard-setting organizations –  be they completely private or 
involving government ministries at varying degrees – are seen as timely and efficient tools 
of coordination that help to overcome market failures and serve a crucial role in research 
and development strategies of innovation (as for high-technology or interoperability 
standards), commercialization and technological diffusion. Insofar as appropriate mecha-
nisms are in place to avoid anti-competitive behaviour and regulatory capture, standards 
are thus understood as ultimately yielding substantial benefits to consumers’ welfare 
(Blind and Gauch 2009; Swann 2010; Viardot et al. 2016). Yet, no simple answer exists 
regarding such inclination towards monopolistic behaviour. Moreover, standards touch 
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on far-reaching issues beyond mere industrial and consumers’ choices, market failures, 
technological innovation and competition. A number of studies thus look beyond the 
environment of the firm and welfare economics to understand how standards themselves 
reflect distinct power relations in their claim to bring more quality and efficiency to 
regulatory authority (Brunsson and Jacobsson 2000; Hallström 2004; Murphy and Yates 
2009; Timmermans and Epstein 2010; Busch 2011; Ponte et al. 2011; Graz 2015). This 
chapter draws on such scholarship to forge a global political economy perspective that 
puts emphasis on the comprehensive foundation of power relations involved in the regula-
tory authority of standards, and on their evolving variety across borders. It argues that 
standards reflect a form of hybrid governance over which global corporations have much 
hold, and which increasingly competes with previous rules governing markets, and more 
generally the social foundations of state power.
The chapter begins with some background on standards and their role in shaping 
market regulation and creation. It then examines the institutional environment in which 
global corporations uphold considerable leverage in setting standards. After that the 
analysis provides some insights on why global corporations are in a position to take 
advantage of such hybrid forms of governance in contemporary global capitalism. The 
conclusion wraps up the argument and draws further implications.
STANDARDS SHAPING MARKETS
‘Standards’ refer here to voluntary technical specifications explicitly documented and 
published as tools for the organization of production and the exchange of goods 
and services. Standards codify technical specifications regarding measurement, design, 
performance, as well as side effects of products, industrial processes and services. This 
includes almost any type of product, process or service. It can be as mundane as metric 
and arithmetic definitions; for example, thread lengths for bolts and nuts (ISO 888). But it 
also takes in intricate business models qualifying the ability of a firm to disaggregate and 
complete complex tasks, such as the Capability Maturity Model Integration in the field 
of services (CMMI for Services) of the CMMI Institute, a technology commercialization 
enterprise working as a subsidiary of Carnegie Mellon University and sponsored by the 
United States (US) Department of Defense. The relatively broad definition of standards 
given above acknowledges a difference between formal standards and other norms that 
arise from unintentional actions and habits (Ponte et al. 2011, p. 2). Formal standards 
are set by entities dedicated to such purpose, be they national standard bodies, members 
of the International Organization for Standardization (ISO), industry-based standards 
developing organizations such as those existing in the United States, research centres and 
management consultancy firms supporting business models, as well as consortia of firms 
and organizations working together to develop technical specifications such as the World 
Wide Web Consortium (W3C) that has designed many web formats and protocols (HTTP, 
HTML, XML, and so on). Whoever sets formal standards, expected compliance mecha-
nisms do exist in the form of various conformity assessment processes and certification 
procedures, with some sort of sanction for non-compliance.
Similarly, the definition used above acknowledges a distinction between technical 
specifications used in regulations set by public authorities, and those that are voluntary 
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and thus formally outside of the mandatory rule of the sovereign state. There is, however, 
considerable overlap between mandatory standards embedded in public regulations, and 
voluntary specifications set by standard-setting bodies. Both types of instruments are so 
much intertwined that studies on legal pluralism refer to such concepts as internormativity 
or transnational private regulatory governance to describe recent developments in which 
the law faces much difficulty in ordering such differentiated societal activities (Frydman 
2014, p. 33ff; Zumbansen 2015). A landmark report that the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) published on non-tariff  measures is unequivocal in that regard:
Although cast as ‘voluntary’ in nature (because they are imposed by private entities), private 
standards (for example ISO & other standards) may become de facto a necessary condition 
for market access even if  not imposed by law . . . the effect of a particular private standard, if  
pervasive, could be greater than that of a government regulation of a smaller country. (World 
Trade Organization 2012, p. 211)
Public authorities have actively encouraged the use of private standards and supported 
their adoption in mature and emerging technologies (EXPRESS 2010; National Science 
and Technology Council 2011; JISC 2013; European Commission 2016a). From this 
perspective, a more extensive use of standards reflects a shift in the articulation between 
the public and the private spheres, rather than a mere voluntary tool of market organiza-
tion. Yet many existing legal provisions still do not take full account of such develop-
ments, and confine international standards to the domain of private voluntary market 
tools provided by private firms.1 Moreover, the overlap between state regulation and 
supposedly voluntary private standards is reinforced by the wide range of institutional 
bodies entitled to confer authority to standards, let alone the numerous actors involved 
in standard-setting procedures (Djelic and den Hond 2014). As Busch points out, ‘private 
standards and public regulations are two similar and sometimes overlapping forms of 
governance’ (Busch 2011, p. 27). In what follows, I examine the institutional environment 
that grants international standards this quasi-official status in technical specifications 
used for market access of goods and services worldwide.
INSTITUTIONS SHAPING STANDARDS
For many decades, many technical specifications were set within the regulatory framework 
of law, and only complemented by standards set by companies and, to a marginal degree, 
national standardization bodies. Today, the regulatory framework of law has yielded 
ground to voluntary standards drafted by a wide range of international or regional stand-
ards-developing organizations (SDOs). The creation of the World Trade Organization 
in 1995 marked a critical juncture. In contrast to the relatively loose provisions of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in place before, the Agreement on 
Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT), the Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA), 
the review of the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS) and the 
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) grant international standards a major 
role in the harmonization of technical specifications applicable to goods and services. 
State regulation in this domain must comply with ‘legitimate objectives’, such as health, 
safety and environmental issues. The goal of removing ‘unnecessary’ barriers to trade 
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should furthermore be pursued as far as possible by substituting domestic standards for 
‘relevant international standards’.2
Reviewing to what extent governments draw on international standards in their 
technical regulations as mandated by the WTO Agreements remains, however, an 
intricate task. Ironically, the lack of  harmonized standards and the incompleteness 
of  existing data hinder the possibility to obtain a reliable and systematic view of the 
matter. However, tentative studies confirm the receptiveness of  policy and regulation 
to the use of  international standards (Fliess et al. 2010; Choi 2013). Be that as it may, 
existing provisions still grant many international bodies the ability to define such 
standards. In order to maintain a shared threshold of  institutional isomorphism despite 
important variations among the most powerful actors of  the world trade system, the 
TBT committee of  the WTO eventually established principles to ensure transparency, 
openness, impartiality and consensus, effectiveness and relevance, coherence, as well as 
guarantees to address the concerns of  developing countries.3 Such principles primarily 
seek to address the differences between the ISO and the European environment on the 
one hand, and the American institutional framework for setting standards on the other. 
The two systems reflect what institutional analyses call a case of  ‘regulatory competi-
tion’ between coordinated and liberal market economies where domestic institutional 
complementarities play a key role (Czaya and Hesser 2001; Tate 2001; Winn 2009; 
Mattli and Büthe 2011). The ISO/European system favours a coordinated standardiza-
tion system with greater reliance on territorially based legitimacy and state oversight; 
the American system gives preference to competing sources of  standards, including 
those set by ad hoc consortia within distinct industries such as in information, com-
munications or telecommunications, and relies on market mechanisms to ensure their 
definition and adoption.
This prompts us to examine further the relation between the ability of global 
corporations to set technical specifications within a market economy, and the political 
environment of the institutional framework required to confer a legitimate authority on 
such practices. The remainder of this section provides an overview of activities related 
to standards developing organizations (SDOs) focused on their two most distinct institu-
tional environments: the European and the American system.
In 1985, the European Council Resolution 85/C 136/01 on a ‘New Approach’ to 
technical harmonization and standardization instigated a new regulatory technique 
and strategy. Although member states were suspicious about seeing regulation in this 
domain transferred to the European authorities, they did perceive the threat of a race 
to the bottom in public purpose standards as market integration progressed. The New 
Approach provides a framework for the harmonization of European Union (EU) manda-
tory regulation only on the general and essential requirements of goods traded on the 
European market, in particular in the fields of health, environment, safety and consumer 
protection. Depending on the sectors affected, technical specifications, performance 
criteria and quality requirements are either based on mutual recognition of national 
standards, or delegated to European standard-setting bodies. In most sectors, the proce-
dure for monitoring standards is a matter of business self-regulation, since products put 
on the market are granted a presumption of conformity, solely based on the declaration 
of the manufacturer (CE marking). The entry into force in 2013 of a new Regulation 
on European standardization (1025/2012) and the adoption in 2016 by the European 
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Commission of a ‘standardization package’ extended those principles to a number of 
domains, while at the same time reinforcing the support for civil society stakeholders 
and small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). It provides for educative and incentive 
actions geared to support greater awareness, cooperation, transparency and inclusiveness. 
Thus, the European system has done more than strengthen the ability of companies to 
rely on voluntary standards rather than mandatory regulation in the Single Market. By 
avoiding costly third-party testing and certification, by addressing concerns with regard 
to its democratic deficit, and by providing procedural means for a simultaneous adoption 
of European standards as international ones (through the so-called Dresden and Vienna 
Agreements), the European Union has also included third parties and third countries 
in its standardization system. The (largely unintended) outcome has been a powerful 
strategic positioning of European standards in the global market (Vogel 1995; Egan 2001; 
Borraz 2007).
In the United States, standardization is more fragmented, and organized on a sectoral 
basis. A variety of competing standards organizations (formal and informal) set market-
driven standards clearer of state intervention than in the European environment. The 
system follows a so-called model of direct participation, where companies have direct 
access to standard-setting activities with international claims. Hundreds of private secto-
ral bodies exist in the United States. Among them, a dozen make up more than 90 per cent 
of standards produced, especially in the petroleum, automotive and other technology-
driven industries. And only three players can claim a global standing, with a wide use of 
their tools beyond their sectoral and territorial basis: Underwriter Laboratories (UL), 
the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) and ASTM International 
(originally known as the American Society for Testing and Materials). With half  of its 
standards sold being purchased outside the United States, ASTM International stands 
out, notably as a result of an active policy of Memoranda of Understanding signed with 
more than 100 national standards bodies, mostly in developing and emerging countries 
(Saudi Arabia, Columbia and Turkey being the three countries most referencing those 
standards). Moreover, the United States standards landscape not only includes sector-
specific activities and specialized organizations such as ASTM International: to a greater 
extent than in the EU, technical specifications are set within alliances in which government 
agencies and private companies, associations and SDOs collaborate to develop so-called 
consortia standards, such as the W3C and the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) 
developing joint specifications for the Internet, cyber-security and other information and 
communication technologies. The United States also gave rise to the Open Source move-
ment. In contrast to the proprietary and closed dimension of most consortia standards, 
Open Source standards such as the Open Office suite or the bibliographic software 
Zotero are based on specifications (mostly computer codes) set collectively in an evolving 
and cumulative process, involving continuous sharing of information over the Internet 
(Cargill and Bolin 2007; Choi 2013).
However, the opposition between the European system and the American institutional 
framework should not be overstated (Egyedi 2005; Graz and Hauert 2014). Framing the 
institutional environment of standardization in such a way tends to reflect the lenses of 
institutional approaches rather than standardization practices themselves. The European 
and American standardization systems have more common characteristics than is usually 
imagined. Both rely on private companies to shape standards on a voluntary basis. They 
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follow a due process open to all interested parties, and their deliberations are based on the 
‘state of the art’. The draft standards are subject to public consultation, and the general 
interest is supposed to prevail over particular interests. They recognize the primacy of 
international standards, even though the understanding of what ‘international’ means still 
remains controversial in the United States Standards Strategy (USSS), in spite of the sub-
stantial revision passed in 2005 for the specific purpose of better addressing such needs. 
Last but not least, both realize that the participation from the weakest stakeholders is in 
such short supply that it undermines the legitimacy of technical specification supposedly 
favouring the public interest. This is why recent policies on both sides of the Atlantic have 
taken initiatives supposedly geared toward supporting the participation of civil society 
organizations. The US standards strategy points out that ‘government should recognize 
its responsibility to the broader public interest by providing financial and legislative sup-
port, and by globally promoting the principles of our standardization system’ (American 
National Standards Institute 2016, p. 12). For its part, Annex III of the EU Regulation 
1025/2012 set the legal framework to better incorporate societal framework, and the 
publication in 2016 of the Standardisation Package includes actions that seek to enhance 
their representation in both the European and the international system.
Despite these similarities, several conflicts remain between European and American 
SDOs. The initiatives detailed in the latest version of  the US strategy include a number 
of  proposals that bring to mind the recent EU package, such as strengthening participa-
tion by the government in the development and use of  voluntary standards, addressing 
the needs of  consumers, promoting a worldwide application of  ‘internationally recog-
nized principles’ (that is, WTO compatible) in the development of  standards, as well as 
a number of  provisions driven towards education and research. Yet, the US strategy 
still claims that ‘market-driven, private sector-led approach to global standardization 
[privileged in the US] is substantially different from the approach favored in many other 
countries’ (American National Standards Institute 2016, p. 4). From the American 
point of  view, the national participation model in the European standardization bodies 
gives them a substantial advantage at the international level (Zuckerman 1996, p. 40; 
Czaya and Hesser 2001, p. 32). Both the Vienna agreement between the ISO and the 
European Committee for Standardization (CEN), and the Dresden agreement between 
the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) and the European Committee 
for Electrotechnical Standardization (CENELEC) can indeed be seen as benefiting 
European actors, as they grant provisions for the adoption of  European standards 
as international ones, and have ensured a coordination of  the standardization work 
between those organizations. Moreover, the European system sets up technical barriers 
to American firms through the distinct role it grants to the European standardization 
bodies. From a European point of  view, the decentralized and fragmented standard-
setting procedures in the United States represent a barrier to the US market. Moreover, 
American SDOs’ claims to serve the public interest often hinder strong commercial 
interests and contending regulatory competition. Finally, the international reach of 
standards developed in the United States tends to undermine the authority of  formal 
standardization arenas such as the ISO and CEN, even if  recent trends suggest a greater 
convergence between both systems, with a greater use of  ISO-compatible standards by 
American SDOs (Choi 2013).
Regardless of the similarities and differences between the European environment and 
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the American institutional framework for setting standards, SDOs must comply with the 
due processes established by the WTO in order to produce ‘internationally recognized 
principles’ likely to be accepted as legitimate regulatory tools. This is why SDO member-
ship and participation in technical committees are formally open to all interested parties, 
and voluntary. Yet, as will be seen below, the largest market actors keep dwarfing commit-
tees, civil society organizations are most often missing, and the participation of emerging 
countries remains relatively low when compared to their rising prominence in the global 
economy. In other words, global corporations from leading industrialized countries enjoy 
much power in setting standards, which more often than not serve as alternatives to 
conventional state regulation.
Just as a proper appraisal of the use of standards is fraught with pitfalls, since no sys-
tematic and official disclosure exists on the matter, it is impossible to accurately estimate 
the participation of distinct categories of stakeholders in standard-setting procedures. 
This is even more the case at the level of the working groups actually drafting standards, 
whose participants serve as technical experts rather than national delegates. Nevertheless, 
a study ordered by the European Commission prior to recent reforms on the access to the 
European standardization system by distinct interested parties provides some ballpark 
evidence. Taking the participation of the business community as a yardstick, the number 
of technical committees in which experts from consumer organizations, environmental 
organizations and trade unions participate is estimated as, respectively, ‘rather low’, 
‘even lower’ and ‘very low’. Despite those poor results, it is striking that, when European 
and international standardization bodies such as the ISO are compared, about a quarter 
of national standardization bodies still perceive the former as easier or much easier to 
access (EIM Business & Policy Research 2009, pp. 81, 98). Once again, those are only 
estimates, often biased by the favourable view publicized by the organizations surveyed 
via web questionnaires. The entry into force of EU Regulations 1025/2012 introduced new 
processes that improved the monitoring and participation of stakeholder organizations 
representing the interests of consumers, workers and SMEs, and environmental interests. 
Yet, the first evaluation undertaken under those new commitments euphemistically points 
out that such participation ‘is still challenged’, notably because of the weak position and 
different capacities in terms of stakeholders’ representation at national level, as well as 
a lack of inclusiveness at the international level (European Commission 2016b, pp. 4, 
11‒12).
The few studies based on actual data corroborate such findings. For instance, compre-
hensive data collected on the inventory of all participants in ISO/CEN mirror committees 
established within the Swiss Standardization Association (SNV) in 1987, 1997 and 2007 
show that business representatives were present in more than 90 per cent of so-called 
national ‘mirror committees’ in which ISO or CEN draft standards are discussed prior 
to taking part in international meetings. For their part, consumer representatives took 
part in 18.2 to 20.8 per cent of the committees, with one association alone accounting 
for more than a quarter of consumer participation (Hauert 2010). This can only bode ill 
for participation of civil society organizations in ISO and other international meetings, 
as experts taking part are chosen among such national mirror committees. For instance, 
consultants, representatives of the industry and of standards organizations themselves 
account for more than 70 per cent of all participants to plenary meetings of the technical 
committee in charge of the well-known series ISO 14000 of environmental management 
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standards (Morikawa and Morrison 2004). Finally, descriptive statistics on participation 
by stakeholders’ groups often reflect dummy data with regard to the ability of corporate 
representatives to organize themselves and defend their interests on a truly global level. 
Personal observations drawn from a ‘research-action’ project, devised to support the 
direct participation of civil society organizations in arenas setting international standards, 
witnessed a number of cases of unambiguous power plays in which, for instance, the 
preferences of one representative of an umbrella industry association prevailed over a 
much larger number of disparate stakeholders’ voices (Hauert et al. 2016).
As a final point, there is still very little commitment from developing and emerging 
countries in standard-setting processes. A core group of six countries share the respon-
sibility of secretariats for approximately 75 per cent of all ISO technical committees and 
subcommittees. However, while China has recently joined this group, which also includes 
Germany, the United States, Japan, France and the United Kingdom, approximately 
one-quarter of the 72 secretariats under the responsibility of the Standardization 
Administration of the People’s Republic of China (SAC) take the form of twinning 
partnerships involving standardization bodies from industrialized countries. In contrast 
to the case of China, the involvement of SDOs from other large emerging countries has 
not increased much. For instance, both the Bureau of Indian Standards (BIS) and the 
Associação Brasileira de Normas Técnicas (ABNT) share less than ten ISO secretariats. 
Figures regarding experts who actively participate in the development of ISO standards 
are of the same type (Afnor 2016). Similarly, as seen above, more than 100 developing 
and emerging countries have signed memoranda of policy with ASTM International, 
but remain to a large extent standard takers rather than standard makers. In a nutshell, 
although ISO and SDOs such as ASTM International have taken a number of measures to 
support participation from developing-country members, the ability of large corporations 
from emerging countries to engage with standard-setting processes remains much more 
limited than in industrialized countries.
THE TRANSNATIONAL HYBRID AUTHORITY OF STANDARDS
In what has become a classic article of economics, Akerlof (1970) provided an important 
argument of why global corporations use standards in modern markets. As markets may 
face major information asymmetries, such as with variable qualities of used cars, sellers 
have information about the goods to be sold which buyers do not possess. Such asym-
metry prevents the market from working properly and can eventually lead to its collapse. 
Developing standards of minimum quality becomes a crucial tool to help in rectifying 
this. There is, however, another rationale for standards. In contrast to defining some 
uniform qualities or interoperability requirements upon which market agents rely in their 
transactions, standards are also designed to differentiate. Standardized, yet differentiated 
products and services are, as Busch highlights, ‘produced simultaneously to be standard 
(when compared to each other) and differentiated in space or time (when compared to 
other products or services), to create a niche targeted at some (larger or smaller) group 
of persons’ (Busch 2011, p. 165, emphasis in original). One of the clearest ways in which 
standards are used to differentiate is in their ability to reinforce path-dependant monopo-
listic and oligopolistic trajectories in technological innovation (David 1985; Mock 2005). 
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Accordingly, a number of prominent cases of standards wars have occurred over many 
decades. While the rivalry between VHS and Betamax formats of video cassettes recorders 
and the subsequent DVD/DivX battle have become iconic, new duels occur constantly 
between competing standards. If  resolved, they provide to the winner an opportunity to 
capture all gains of the market ; if  not, they create a risk of sinking it altogether (Shapiro 
and Varian 1999). Today, new energies devoted to such standards wars are focused on the 
Internet of Things and the wider interconnectivity framework on which global corpora-
tions rely to increase their power in platform capitalism (Bratton 2015; Tilley 2016).
Such a political economy of innovation has led Dudouet et al. (2006) to conceive 
standardization as a process of appropriation with significant incidence on market 
power and competition. Although they do not grant exclusive exploitation rights as with 
patents, standards do codify technical specifications that can de facto exclude alternative 
technology and contending processes. Innovative technology conforming to such stand-
ards often includes patented technology, for instance in large-scale and forward-looking 
information technology-enabled business services relying on extensive databases and 
complex algorithms. Such neo-Schumpeterian lenses provide a persuasive explanation as 
to why large firms are likely to use standards for maintaining their domination on distinct 
technologies. It is less focused, however, on how the power of such standards redefines the 
articulation between the economic and political spheres. Moreover, the approach tends to 
overlook the extent to which the issue to be standardized affects the power configurations 
at stake. For instance, to what extent can the establishment of sustainability standards 
– including labour, environment and gender provisions – be clearly distinguished from
standards established as instruments to develop technical interfaces for platforms such
as Uber, Amazon Web Services or Google? Finally, neo-Schumpeterian approaches
do not explicitly examine how international standards may undermine the constitutive
principles of the territorial sovereignty of states; and, conversely, the role that states
and intergovernmental organizations play in supporting the authority of international
standards deserves further attention.
In order to respond to these shortcomings, a first step is to elaborate upon what I call 
the ‘transnational hybrid authority’ of standards. The concept describes a form of author-
ity based on the ambiguous juxtaposition of instances of power transforming the relation 
between transnational capitalism and territorial sovereignty. The notion of hybridity 
is often used to serve as a handy default attribute to describe the complex features of 
contemporary global governance. Used in such a way, however, it is likely to reinforce 
– not to qualify or clarify – the latest wave of the globalization backlash. Rather than a
default attribute, the notion of hybridity conveys here more generic attributes likely to
help us make sense of the ability of standards to shape market access and regulation in
contemporary capitalism. Insights from science, technology and society (STS) studies or
post-colonial studies may differ as far as their theoretical foundations are concerned. Yet,
they come together in viewing ambiguity as the prevailing feature in the criteria that define 
hybridity. A conceptual linchpin in Latour’s analyses that gave rise to STS studies, hybrids
describe ‘quasi-objects’ mediating nature‒society relations: they reflect the erosion of the
great divide that modernity failed to establish between society and nature, humans and
non-humans, society and science (Latour 1991). To some extent, the notion of hybridity
also established the very field of post-colonial studies, with a focus on blurred subjectivi-
ties and identities of the colonized subjects and their ability, in the ambivalence of the
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post-colonial encounter, to craft moments of ‘historical agency’ (Bhabha 1994, p. 208). 
Far from a vague combination of actors involved in global governance, ambiguity thus 
reflects an ontological property of the new tools of global governance to which standards 
fully belong.
The nature and the implications of the ambiguity upon which rests the ability of global 
corporations to set standards that subsequently shape market organization, access and 
regulation calls for a more detailed analytical framework. A vast literature on the rise of 
non-state actors and private authority has mushroomed against the backdrop of globali-
zation (Cutler et al. 1999; Graz and Nölke 2008; Guzzini and Neumann 2012; Payne and 
Phillips 2014; Abbott et al. 2015). Such scholarship views globalization as a joint process 
of state power and market forces, with new patterns and agents of structural change 
through formal and informal power and regulatory practices. With so much emphasis on 
the actors gaining authority in private regulatory tools, the literature tends, however, to 
overlook the scope of regulatory practices involved, and the reconfiguration of the spatial 
structure in which such practices are implemented. This prompts us to aggregate the 
three following categories: not only the actors (who have the authority to set standards) 
but also the objects (what is standardized) and the space (where and whence standards 
are implemented). They provide a comprehensive yet differentiated picture of the wide 
range of actors involved in setting standards, the breadth of issues concerned, and the 
deterritorialization of sovereignty conveyed by the multiple systems of certification and 
accreditation worldwide. I examine those three dimensions in more detail below.
The first dimension of the framework is the ‘institutional continuum’ of actors in the 
public and the private spheres. As laid out earlier, there is much ambiguity on situating 
standards along this continuum, and that ambiguity plays its part in conferring author-
ity on a range of corporate actors previously denied such capacity. Market forces and 
policy choices both affect the ability of agents to influence standardization, although in 
various ways. Technical specifications belong to the private sphere of economic activities 
governed by market constraints: they affect social and technological change from that 
angle. However, they remain related to the public sphere of political action and regula-
tory policies directed toward the general interest of society; for instance by determining 
a certain level of risk and setting principles of liability borne by global corporations or, 
a  contrario, by allowing their rent-seeking behaviour and market power. Hence, even 
in the circumscribed field of technical specifications, norms relate as much to capital 
accumulation and technical progress as to social improvement or various instruments of 
the welfare state.
The second dimension thus charts the ‘material continuum’ that outlines what can 
be standardized along the two poles of the physical and societal worlds. In aggregating 
the relationship between human beings and nature, technical specifications range from 
natural and invariable physical measures to constructed and historically bound societal 
values. This dimension highlights the extended scope of international standardization. 
Long thought of only for physical requirements of specification such as those set for nuts 
and bolts, standards now cover all sorts of issues with clear and present implications for 
the societal world. For instance, recent European initiatives to standardize medical treat-
ments, healthcare and elderly services are likely to have major implications in terms of 
potential social dumping, and interference with regulatory frameworks established in law, 
defined in collective agreements or set out in professional guidelines. The question then 
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is: do global corporations seek to standardize the material support enabling the delivery 
of health services, or rather substantial aspects of the services themselves irrespective of 
the context of their provision (such as professional competences, clinical processes and 
patient communication)? If  the latter is true, standards unavoidably include contested 
cultural values and power relations, including labour processes.
The third dimension is the ‘spatial continuum’ where the jurisdictions that support 
the system of recognition of standards overlap. While international standardization is 
driven by attempts to homogenize and clearly differentiate technical specifications across 
national jurisdictions in order to reach a higher level of regulatory convergence, it faces a 
plurality of standards. It rests on the dual nature of sovereignty: ‘the juridical expression 
of the principle that divides the planet into clearly demarcated lines of authority and 
responsibility’ on the one hand, and ‘the foundation of the national and international 
law of contract’ required by capitalism on the other (Palan 2003, p. 86). From this view, 
compliance to standards needs hybrid spaces that reinforce such dual nature of sover-
eignty. Their recognition rests both on the territorial inscription of sovereignty as well as 
on the transnational guarantees given to the principle of contract inviolability in a world 
of globalized capitalism. This is why, for instance, only one standard-setting body per 
country is eligible to membership in the ISO, even if  many of them are non-governmental 
bodies identified as the ‘most representative of standardisation in their country’. At the 
same time, compliance to standards first and foremost rests on their use by market actors 
across the globe. As we have seen, a flurry of standards are set and used away from any 
defined system of national representation and delegation, and are nevertheless entrenched 
in sovereign contract law. Sustainability labels used by global corporations in global 
value chains are cases in point, such as the Roundtable for Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO), 
or the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) guidelines on presentation of information. 
As a final point, it should be noted that, in the absence of harmonized regulation or 
standards, mutual recognition of standards and regulations reflects a step further toward 
the transnational plane of the law of contract on which the power projection of global 
corporations rests. Mutual recognition is in fact designed to ensure that governments 
recognize each other’s standards and accept results of testing, inspection, certification or 
accreditation bodies in specified industries. In Europe, for instance, products not subject 
to technical harmonization at the EU level should in principle be freely exchangeable as 
long as they conform to domestic specifications and regulations of a member state. This 
is one of the key issues of the regulatory convergence sought by trade deals such as TTIP, 
TPP and CETA.
CONCLUSIONS
This chapter has provided insights on how and why global corporations uphold 
 considerable leverage in setting standards in their own interest; not only in shaping 
innovation, but more broadly in designing market regulation that would traditionally 
be seen as part of  the public domain. In the face of  the role played by consumers and 
employees using and recognizing these standards, some scholars regard such corporate 
dominance, together with the lack of  proper representation and actual participation 
from labour and consumer interests, as likely to undermine claims to legitimacy made by 
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standardization bodies (Farquhar 2006; Wilcock and Colina 2007). As Bamberg points 
out, ‘standardization is characterized by a paradox of  “large minorities.” The two biggest 
groups concerned (370 million consumers, including 165 million salaried employees, 
in the EU) are in the minority on standardization committees . . . if  represented at all’ 
(Bamberg 2004, p. 13).
The chapter shows, however, that global corporations can rely on such standards to 
exercise a form of alternative authority to conventional state regulation and intergov-
ernmental agreements (see, for a related discussion, Chapter 22 by May in this volume). 
It argues that the authority of standards benefits from a peculiar form of ambiguity 
defining the actors involved in standard-setting procedures, the wide range of issues 
concerned, and the territorial space through which an extensive use of standards may be 
recognized as a legitimate definition of market access by sovereign states. This is what I 
call the ‘transnational hybrid authority’ of standards.
This chapter draws attention to the lack of  fully reliable and systematic data on the use 
of  standards – and hence, their recognition – and the participation of  distinct categories 
of  stakeholders, such as global corporations, in standard-setting processes. It provides, 
however, some evidence of  the ability of  corporate representatives to organize themselves 
and defend their interests on a truly global level. Another limitation of  the analysis 
is that it does not allow for a review of how global corporations sometimes behave 
in an opposite way. In such cases, their strong resistance to international standards 
is not driven by concerns regarding the democratic deficit of  the institutions shaping 
standardization, but by concerns that standards might compete with the market power 
of  their own global brands.
NOTES
1. For instance, the Swiss Federal Act on Technical Barriers to Trade (946.51 – art. 11) limits state support or 
direct participation in standards-setting bodies to standards referred in public law and therefore acquiring
a status of mandatory state regulation.
2. Among the legal texts of the WTO, see in particular articles 2 and 5, as well as Annex 3 of the TBT
Agreement; article X.2b of the GPA Agreement; article 3 of the SPS Agreement; and articles VI and VII
of the GATS.
3. Annex 4, Decision of the Committee on Principles for the Development of International Standards, Guides 
and Recommendations with Relation to Articles 2, 5 and Annex 3 of the Agreement, WTO TBT Triennial 
Review, WTO Committee on TBT, G/TBT/9; 11 November 2000, p. 24.
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